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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
MERRILL HOLBROOK,
Defendant and Appellant,

vs.

Case No.
729&

LOUISE HOLBROOK,
Plaintiff and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Respondent feels that Appellant has sufficiently and
fairly stated the facts of the case in so far as said statement is confined to dates, events and figures, but Respondent differs with Appellant upon his construction of the
rulings of the court below as the same are set forth in said
Statement of Facts, and differs with Appellant's statement
on two points, to wit:
1. Respondent states the fact to be that Appellant
was sentenced to the county jail for a period of thirty days;
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said sentence to be suspended upon payment of $645.00 to
the Clerk of the Court (Tr. p. 52).
2. Respondent further states the fact to be that the
court did consider Appellant's petition for a modification of
a decree but did not find facts sufficient to justify a modification thereof (Tr. p. 52).
ARGUMENT
1.
The contention that the court erred in its finding as
to Appellant's earnings of $435.00 per month is without
merit.
There isn't any testimony upon which the court must
find, based upon a preponderance of evidence, that Appellant's mother owns the home and receives the rents and
profits thereof. These is a preponderance of testimony to
the contrary. The deed to Appellant's mother was for his
accommodation (Tr. p. 53). Appellant will have the home
when the mortgage is paid (Tr. p. 43). Appellant has the
duty to pay the mortgage (Tr. p. 38). Appellant manages the
home (Tr. p. 45). Appellant used rents for car payments
(Tr. p. 44). Appellant's employees receive and receipt for
the rents at Appellant's place of work (Tr. p. 45). Appellant gets and disburses the rents (Tr. p. 45).
It seems pertinent to point out that Appellant does
not cite as error the fact that the lower court found that he
was able to pay $150.00 each month, for it is the law of Utah,
or so Respondent believes, that inability to pay the sums
provided by the decree is a defense to a contempt action.
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Appellant cites only as error the lack of a Finding that he
had $645.00 on January 11, 1949 with which to pay arrears.
This implied admission of ability to comply with the decree
found in the failure to cite the ruling on ability as error
is an admission that Appellant earns more than the $300.00
he specified to be his salary, or has available for any use he
cares to make of it a sum in excess of $300.00 per month.
All the foregoing, together with the repeated evasions
or attempts to evade examination of his actions, as they
appear throughout the testimony, justified the court in
feeling that Appellant was not entitled to belief and did
have the income found by the court which was $435.00 less
house expense.

2.
The court did not err in holding the defendant to be in
contempt.
Appellant in his assignment of errors states that the
court did not find that Appellant was able to pay the $6415.00
in arrears, and that the contempt order is invalid in the
absence of such a finding.
Counsel for Respondent submits that Appellant either
reads or states the law incorrectly.
This is not a case where a party is incarcerated until
he performs. The order. is not to that effect. The order is
for a term certain-thirty days-suspended if Appellant
wants or is able to secure a suspension thereof.
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The order of the court in this matter was punitive
rather than purposive-to use the terms of Appellant. At
page 51 of the Transcript the court said
"And I hold you in contempt for not having
paid."
At page 53 the court said
"He is in contempt of this court for not living
up to the decree."
The court then imposed sentence and stated terms of suspension.
Respondent believes there is a distinction between cases
where a contemnor is lodged in a jail indefinitely until he
pays or performs and cases where a contemnor is sentenced
to a term certain and subject to suspension on performance
of a condition such as payment of a sum due the other party.
In the first class the intent is completely purposive and the
latter it is primarily punitive-as punishment for a past
act.
The cases of Snook v. Snook, 188 Pac. 502 and Watson
v. Watson, 72 Utah 218, 269 Pac. 775, cited by Appellant,
are both cases where the contemnor was given an indefinite
term to continue until he performed-a term amounting
to life perhaps. These cases are entirely purposive and do
not seem to be in point here in view of the specific sentence.
Respondent respectfully represents the law applicable
to this case to be as follows:
If imprisonment is to continue until payment is made,
present ability to pay must be shown. If imprisonment is
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for a term certain as punishment for a past act of contempt
or for past acts, then present ability to pay is not a consideration. That, even if ability to pay is a necessary adjunct to
a valid contempt sentence, a contemnor who voluntarily or
contumaciously brings on himself the inability to obey
cannot avail himself of such inability as a defense.
Galland v. Galland, 44 Cal. 475, 13 Am. St. Rep.
167
State v. District Cour·t, 37 Mont. 485, 97 Pac.
841
Staples v. Staples, 87 'Vis. 592, 58 N. W. 1036,
24 L. R. A. 433
Appellant has not suffered a decrease in earnings, but
an increase. He paid nothing on the mortgage on the house
nor on repairs in July or August nor for the support of his
four children. He thereafter elected to repair, instead of
support, as provided by the decree, and after repairs elected
to buy a car instead of support his four children as provided
by the decree.
Presuming that Appellant ea~ns $300.00 and no more
as he maintains, he obligates himself to pay $129 per month
or 43% of his total earnings on a new Buick car because he
has owned a car since he was eighteen and is not going to
go without one any longer (Tr. p. 48). He gives no reason
why he paid nothing whatsoever in July and August. Such
sums as were paid were done so in violation of the decree
requiring him to pay the same to the Clerk.
In such cases of past acts constituting a disobedience
of a decree and a term certain of imprisonment a punish-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
ment for said disobedience, can it be right or logical to say
that the punishment is illegal or the sentence invalid if a
suspension condition is attached to it?
The burden of proving inability to pay, if ability to pay
is necessary to sustain a contempt order under all circumstances, is on Appellant and not on Respondent as maintain~d by Appellant in his brief at page 7.

State v. Cook, 66 Ohio 566, 64 N. E. 5-67, 58
L. R. A. 625
Fowler v. Fowler, 61 Okla. 280, 161 Pac. 227,
L. R. A. 1917 C 89.
Further, that present lack of money as a defense for
failure to pay past installments is not available to a party
if there has been any material income during the period
of failure to comply with the decree.

Staples v. Staples, 87 Wis. 592, 58 N. W. 1036,
24 L. R. A. 433
Tolman v. Leonard, 6,6 App. D. C. 224
Barclay v. Barclay, 184 Ill. 471, 56 N. E. 821
Deen v. Bloomer, 191 Ill. 416, 61 N. E. 131
Lake v. Judge, 172 Mich. 660, 138 N. W. 249
Shaffner v. Shaffner, 212 Ill. 492, 72 N. E. 447
Cahzin v. Cahzin, 112 N. Y. S. 525.

3.
Reasonably construed, the order of the trial judge is
to the effect that changed financial circumstances of the
wife is not such a change in this case as to be considered
sufficient for a modification of the decree.
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Appellant in his brief appears to complain of the lower
court on the following items :
1. The court refused to hear evidence regarding change
in financial circumstances of wife.

2. That the court held that change in financial condition of wife was not a matter to be considered at all in determining whether there should be a reduction.
Respondent contends that the court did not refuse to
hear evidence. The court did refuse to hear irrelevant evidence (Tr. p. 21) on the purchase of a home and type of
home (Tr. p. 22). Respondent was aware that a petition
for reduction was being heard concurrently and opened the
question on direct examination of Respondent (Tr. p. 9 et
seq.). Appellant did not ever pursue the subject on his cross
examination of Respondent. The testimony shows that the
court was fully informed on the earnings of Respondent.
A reasonable interpretation of the lower court's views
as set forth on page 23 of the Transcript does not appear to
support the construction placed on it by Appellant. The
court stressed the needs of the children, then the earnings
of Appellant, and held that, in the absence of a change of
either of these factors, he would not consider change in the
circumstances of the mother, Respondent. Respondent contends that the court, by inference, held that if the only
change to be shown was the change in financial circumstances of the mother no reduction would be made. That in
his discretion such a change, and nothing more, would not
warrant a reduction.
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Respondent contends that such a position is a correct
one and is supported by law.
Respondent admits that a change in the financial
circumustances of the mother is a factor that a court may
consider on questions of modification of decrees for support
money, but Respondent hasn't found a case that holds that
the decree must be modified when the mother becomes employed after the entry of the decree. The citations of Appellant are significant, not for that they hold but for what
Appellant has withheld from them in his discussion of them
in his brief. In Lines v. Lines, a minor child reaching
majority, a remarried father and a decree providing for a
graduated scale were matters in addition to mother's employment; In Sullivan v. Sullivan the father's health had
become impaired, he was unemployed, a male child was of
age and self supporting, were factors in addition to mother's
employment; in Caprio v. Caprio the mother had remarried,
had income, and her husband had consented to share support of child with her were also factors considered in addition to wife's employment; In Kavanaugh v. Kavana'ltgh
the mother was employed, children were grown and employed, father had remarried a woman who couldn't work.
The facts in the cases cited by Appellant are so different
from the case of Appellant that they serve the Respondent
and take this case out of the scope of the principle contended
for.
Respondent contends that a principle has no application
to a matter unless the facts upon which it is based are
analogous to those at hand. Respondent also contends that
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employment of the mother, as the sole fact or factor constituting a change of circumstances between the parties subsequent to the decree, is not such a change in circumstances
and conditions as to permit, as a matter of law, a modification of the decree pursuant to the provisions of Section
40-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 1943. Remarriage of mother
is not such a change permitted by Section 40-3-5. To society
and to women, marriage and employment are synonymous,
each being the two most frequent means of existence to
women \vith the less fortunate employing the latter means.
An unmarried employed mother received a monthly sum in
cash. A remarried unemployed mother receives the equivalent but not in cash. It seems to be a distinction without a
difference to arrive at a different result in the two cases.
In the case of Rock'toood v. Rockwood, quoted by Appellant, a careful reading of that case leads to the conclusion that the ability of the mother to support is not such
a change that would warrant a modification. Appellant
contends and Respondent agrees that it is probably an open
question in this state as to whether or not the mother's
ability acquired subsequently to the decree is such a change
as to warrant a modification. Respondent questions the
reasonableness of the Appellant's interpretation of the
Rockwood case set forth in his brief at page 13. It is submitted that the court in the Rockwood case meant to say
that the mother's employment, if shown, would not have
inured to the benefit of the father by way of reduction of
support money.
Respondent submits that the duty of the father to
support is measured by his financial and social status after
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the decree and not by the financial or social status of wife,
nor by their combined financial condition before the decree,
Butle1· v. Butler, 26 S. W. 415; that the responsibility for
rearing and training children rests with the mother and the
duty to provide means for maintenance and education is
with the father, Cowley v. Cowley, 202 Pac. 10, 59 Utah 80;
that there may be departures from the aforesaid rules, but
each departure therefrom must stand on its own merits,
Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh, 35 A. (2d) 691; that subsequent
employment of former wife may be a circumstance that
might justify a modification of allowance for support, as ·
a matter of judicial discretion, if there were appealing
equities in former husband's situation, Morris v. Morris,
(Neb.) 290 N. W. 720; and that no such appealing equity
is present in the instant case as to warrant the modification
requested.

n

1

CONCLUSION
Respondent says that this matter is one of equity and
the whole record may be viewed, and when so viewed the
judgment and orders of the lower court should be affirmed
as correct in the result reached by said court.
Respectfully s4bmitted,
KEITH BROWNE,
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON,
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
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